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Introduction
At the dawn of the 21st Century, the existing world 
order is under attack. As the War on Terrorism attempts to 
dismantle violent threats to world stability, massive 
protests continue against the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and other instruments of global economic integration.  The 
expansive international media coverage of such events has 
focused the world’s attention on the widening global gap 
between rich and poor, and the increasingly desperate 
measures employed by those who seek to alter the status quo.  
Whether one talks of “globalization” or “interdependence,” 
it is clear that rising voices for change have prompted a
re-examination of the current policies and organizational 
structures used to promote and regulate international trade 
and sustainable development.1  Given the enormous scope of 
the current fight to reshape the economic world order, it is 
an interesting paradox that one of its most important 
battles is taking place at the molecular level over the role 
to be played by genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
2Uncertainties regarding the implications of GMO use 
have engendered controversy in many spheres - political, 
ethical, scientific, environmental and economic.  Questions 
persist regarding the benefits and risks of the technology 
and the correct regulatory approaches to address them.  The 
uncertainty of liability for harms flowing from the use of 
GMOs in agriculture has contributed to stringent regulation, 
trade barriers, massive lawsuits, and the rejection of 
desperately needed food aid.2  Clearly, the societal costs 
of such uncertainty are high.  
By clarifying the legal standards and reasoning 
applicable to various GMO disputes, the legal profession can 
facilitate better decision making by the relevant actors, 
thereby lowering societal costs.  This task is best 
accomplished by examining the considerations motivating 
participants in the GMO controversy and the impact of those 
considerations on current GMO policies.  Thereafter, the 
legal profession can further define the role of GMOs in the 
existing legal structure or fashion new approaches to meet 
the novel challenges presented by the technology.  
GMOs present liability issues in a wide range of 
contexts.  Risks to consumers, the environment, and various 
economic interests all must be accounted for, with each type 
of risk posing distinct liability issues that require 
3solutions tailored to the relevant situation.  This paper 
seeks to contribute to the process of developing liability 
principles applicable to disputes involving GM plant 
varieties by giving an overview of the technology and 
relevant issues (part I) as well as current international 
approaches to GMO regulation and liability (part II).  It 
concludes by recommending liability standards applicable to 
various harms, as well as possible international frameworks 
to facilitate the implementation of those standards (part 
III).
Part I
GMO Technology and Relevant Issues
Among the many players in the globalization drama, 
perhaps none plays a more crucial role than agriculture.  
Lacking large numbers of highly skilled workers or 
widespread access to capital, the economies of many 
developing countries depend heavily on agricultural trade.3
As such, the optimal functioning of an international market 
in agricultural related products is crucial to meeting the 
development goals of these nations.4  Yet developing 
countries seeking progress via increased markets for their 
agricultural exports face substantial obstacles.  Large 
4government agricultural subsidies in developed countries, 
widespread drought accompanying global climate change, 
expanding intellectual property protections for plant 
varieties controlled by corporate interests- these are just 
some of the factors which threaten the viability of 
sustainable agricultural economies in the developing world.5
Yet no issue appears as divisive or as uncertain as the role 
GMOs will play in shaping the outcome of the emerging 
international trade and development structure.  Some 
background history of the technology and the debate can help 
cut through the fierce rhetoric currently employed by both 
sides.
A. GMO Technology
The technology employed to produce GMOs belongs to the 
field known as “biotechnology.”  The United Nations has 
defined biotechnology to mean “any technological application 
that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes 
for specific use.”6  Despite the more recent coining of the 
term, the underlying technology itself has been around for 
ages without creating catastrophic consequences or any 
notable regulatory difficulties.  Farmers and biologists 
5have been crossbreeding selected traits in plants and 
animals for ages, usually within a single species or species 
complex.7
Many of the most common foods we eat today were 
initially derived through the application of selective 
breeding technology.  For example, Brussels sprouts, 
cabbage, broccoli and cauliflower all were selectively bred 
from the wild mustard seed.8  Yet the technology behind the 
process of selective genetic breeding has advanced to the 
point where it is now possible to combine desirable traits 
of two parent organisms into a single offspring without 
either of the parents belonging to closely related species.9
For instance, instead of crossbreeding two types of soybeans 
to transfer desired properties into the resulting hybrid 
seed, scientists today can identify desired traits in the 
DNA of organisms far removed from soybeans, and insert those 
traits directly into the genetic makeup of the new seed.  
The results of genetic engineering can be as intriguing 
as a tobacco plant with glowing leaves, created by crossing 
firefly genes with the genes of a tobacco plant.10  The 
addition of genes from vastly different organisms is 
accomplished through the use of recombinant DNA 
technology.11  The resulting organism is referred to as 
6either a GMO, an LMO (for Living Modified Organism), or as a 
“transgenic” product.12
In recent years the proliferation of transgenic crops 
has been dramatic.  From 1996 to 2002, the global area of 
transgenic crops increased more than 35-fold.13  The 
greatest GMO planting has been in soybeans, corn, canola and 
cotton.14  Today, GMOs comprise over 21% of world planting 
in these four principal crops, accounting for farming in 
excess of 58 million hectares, an area approximately two and 
a half times the size of the United Kingdom.15  While GMO 
planting appears to have reached a plateau in industrialized 
countries, the rate of adoption of GMO crops in developing 
countries has steadily increased16.  The increased use of 
GMO crops in developing countries is not surprising, given 
the history of the technology. 
Widespread research into the promises of selective 
genetic engineering developed strongly during the 1970’s, 
partly in response to concern that accelerating world 
population growth would soon outstrip sustainable world food 
production levels.  Fear of the resulting mass starvation 
prompted increased scientific inquiry into technological 
breakthroughs capable of improving global food productivity 
and genetic diversity.17 In recent decades, however, the 
efficiencies in agricultural production reached in part from 
7technological advances such as GMOs have led many to 
conclude that the biggest problem for those facing 
starvation is not the insufficiency of the world food 
supply, but poverty.  It is abject poverty stemming from a 
host of political, economic, and environmental problems that 
denies people sufficient access to food.18 This revelation 
is important in the GMO context because as the benefits and 
risks of the technology are debated, an important question 
to address is the effect GMOs will have on poverty in the 
very developing nations whose starvation concerns ignited 
the initial forays into the technology.  The assessment of 
the role of GMOs in either exacerbating or alleviating 
poverty in the developing world will play a large part in 
determining the appropriate policies regarding risk 
assessment procedures as well as the allocation of liability 
in GMO disputes.
Compounding the task of developing appropriate policies 
regarding GMOs is the fact that there currently exists 
considerable disagreement regarding their benefits and 
risks.19 Both opponents and supporters of GMOs have 
divergent views on what expanding use of the technology will 
mean for human health, the environment, and the global 
economy.  What follows is a summary of some of the most 
8pervasive arguments for and against the use of GMOs in these 
contexts.
B. Human Health Implications
Supporters of GMOs tout the many potential benefits of 
the technology for human health, including increased 
nutritional values of foods and the development of bio-
pharmaceuticals.  While current GMO crops have largely 
resulted in benefits for seed companies and farmers, ”second 
generation” GMO crops promise to offer consumers added 
nutritional benefits.20 These benefits include products with 
more vitamins and minerals, greater cancer fighting 
properties, less fatty acids, and reduced toxins and 
allergens.21
A widely publicized GMO containing added nutritional 
benefits is “golden rice.”  Golden rice is rice genetically 
enhanced to contain added iron and beta-carotene, the 
precursor to vitamin A, to help prevent blindness and 
improve the effectiveness of immune systems.22  Such 
products are vital to alleviating malnutrition in the 
developing world, where close to 800 million people are 
undernourished.23
9Genetic modification of plants to add pharmaceutical 
properties offers incredible potential to lower the cost of 
treatment for many ailments.  For instance, researchers are 
working to build a vaccine for hepatitis B into bananas.  
This reduces the dosage cost from $125 to 2 cents, while 
avoiding the costs of refrigeration and administration by 
medical personnel.24 Instead of taking vast amounts of 
pills, people can conceivably get their needed vaccines and 
medications simply by eating doctor approved 
“pharmafoods”.25
In addition to the seemingly limitless potential human 
health benefits, supporters point out that no scientific 
evidence currently exists that demonstrates current GM foods 
pose health risks.26 Producers of GMOs know exactly what 
genetic traits they are inserting into their products, while 
products produced through traditional “wide cross” breeding 
methods can not selectively screen out undesired traits.27
GM products also undergo extensive pre-market testing for 
toxicity and allergen properties that traditional products 
are not forced to comply with, all of which may render GM 
foods safer than their traditional and organic 
counterparts.28
While current GM foods have not been shown to have 
adverse effects, that fact is of little comfort to opponents 
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of GMOs who argue that because GM foods have only recently 
come to market, their long-term effects have yet to be 
studied.29 The addition of novel genes to familiar foods 
presents many with a recipe for disaster.30 According to a 
Greenpeace GMO opponent, dangerous unforeseen consequences 
from genetic modification are extremely likely.  ”Because no 
gene ever functions in isolation, there will almost always 
be unexpected and unintended ‘side effects’ from the gene or 
genes transferred into an organism.”31
The demonstrated health risks of GMOs include the 
possibility of allergic reactions.  In late 2000 – early 
2001 hundreds of different food products were recalled 
because they contained a GM corn that the FDA had not 
approved for human consumption, citing concerns over 
possible allergic reactions.32 The lack of effective 
quarantine procedures to isolate GMO grain from traditional 
grain at many levels of the production and distribution 
lines means future contamination scares are a very real 
possibility.33 Commingling, mishandling, and genetic drift 
all pose obstacles to efforts to isolate GMOs from 
traditional crops in the food supply.34 Along with the 
danger of allergic reaction is the possibility that the 
widespread use of antibiotic resistance marker genes35 in GM 
crops could increase the antibiotic resistance of human 
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pathogens.36 This would render many essential antibodies 
ineffective, hampering the ability of doctors to control 
disease outbreaks.37
B. Implications for the Environment 
Proponents of GMOs argue that the widespread use of 
transgenic crops will benefit the environment in multiple 
ways.  GMO products will allow for the dissemination of a 
smaller amount of hazardous materials into the environment 
while simultaneously demanding less of the limited natural 
resources needed to grow crops.38 By creating crops with 
built in insect or herbicide resistance, GM crop producers 
can decrease the amount of toxic chemicals farmers must 
constantly apply to their fields.39  GMOs used as animal 
feed can be created to reduce the amount of harmful 
pollutants like phosphorous that are passed from animals 
into the environment40.  Because yields will increase due to 
fewer pests and more uniform, robust crops, less land needs 
to be converted to agricultural use, leaving existing 
ecosystems undisturbed.41  Higher yields and less cropland 
also translate into reduced tilling and water use, 
minimizing soil erosion and easing demands on limited fresh 
water supplies.42
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Scientists are also exploring ways to use GMOs in 
environmental remediation and conservation.  By using GMOs 
bio-engineered to absorb metals or detoxify hazardous 
substances, environmental cleanups can be done in a more 
ecologically friendly manner.43  It is also possible to use 
GMOs as biosensors to act as warning systems to the presence 
of hazardous materials.44 GMOs can assist in the recovery of 
endangered species as well as species that have been 
devastated by exotic pests.45  It may even be possible 
through cloning procedures to reintroduce extinct species 
into their native habitat.46  In such ways GMOs could
contribute to a valuable increase in genetic diversity. 
Where GMO proponents see the technology as holding 
promising environmental benefits, critics see cause for 
serious concern, and express doubts about the validity of 
pro-GMO claims.  GMO critics argue that alongside the 
potential to bring about dangerous unintended consequences 
in the organisms being genetically engineered is the risk 
that GMOs will provoke damaging unintended effects on 
surrounding ecosystems.  Ecosystems survive on a delicate 
balance of complex factors.  This balance can be easily 
disrupted by the presence of foreign species or 
redistribution amongst symbiotic species.47  GMOs may 
contribute to disrupting the balance of ecosystems through 
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gene flow, displacement of other species, loss of genetic 
diversity and associated environmental damage.48
Gene flow describes the transfer of genes to other 
organisms and is seen as a sizeable risk of GM crops.49 Gene 
flow is greatest between crops and neighboring wild 
relatives but can also occur “horizontally” through 
transfers to bacteria in the soil or to animals that eat the 
crops.50 One danger is that gene flow from GMOs to wild 
species will confer a “fitness advantage” on certain plants, 
placing other species in the ecosystem at risk of being 
squeezed out in favor of the stronger plant, thereby 
disrupting the balance of the ecosystem.51  A particularly 
disquieting prospect is the thought of “superweeds” that 
have acquired the herbicide resistance of their GMO 
neighbors.52  Such pests would work to counteract the 
supposed productivity gains of GMOs and may result in the 
need for weed control methods that are even more toxic than 
current spraying practices.53 GMOs bred to contain 
insecticides, such as Bt corn, could prompt insects to 
mutate into “superbugs” necessitating the use of more 
environmentally hazardous pesticides.54 Toxins produced by 
insect-resistant crops could potentially harm non-target 
beneficial insects that are natural pest predators.55  The 
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overall effect could be an increase in the pest population 
and a decline in insect genetic diversity.56 While seed 
companies and government agencies like the EPA can require 
GMO planters to institute programs aimed at mitigating these 
effects, no program will be able to eliminate the dangers 
entirely.57
Another environmental danger commonly linked to GMOs is 
that large-scale cultivation of GM crops could bring about a 
decrease in genetic diversity.  Because of the considerable 
expense involved in bringing a GMO to market, companies are 
likely to develop only varieties they foresee as profitable.  
Currently, farmers in the developed world constitute the 
biggest market for GMOs, and the bulk of their trade occurs 
in a small number of crops such as corn and soybeans – crops 
not favored by farmers in many parts of the developing 
world.58  If farmers in developing countries switch to GM 
varieties over traditional local crops in an attempt to 
achieve greater production efficiencies, important crop 
varieties in those countries could become scarce or 
nonexistent.  If GMOs transfer their increased “fitness” 
genes (better resistance to insects, etc.) to wild 
relatives, essential varieties of species could be lost.59
The resulting homogenization of cropland could mean a 
decreased pool of genetic resources from which to extract 
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valuable medical cures or other important biological 
applications.60 This is of course in addition to the 
attendant losses to cultural and national heritage, as well 
as scenic beauty.61  Society’s decision to trade losses in 
these areas for potential gains from GMOs is complicated by 
the lack of an objectively quantifiable method or scale on 
which to effectively assess competing values.62
C. Economic Implications
While the persuasiveness of arguments concerning the 
health and environmental impacts of GMOs are handicapped on 
both sides of the debate by a lack of scientific certainty, 
that disability is lessened when discussing the economic 
implications of the technology.  While the enormous 
potential economic repercussions of GMOs leave much room for 
argument63, many specific financial gains and losses arising 
from the technology have already been identified.
For supporters of GMOs the economic argument is simple.  
GM products help farmers expand production yields at lower 
costs.  These production savings can than be passed along to 
consumers as cost savings.64  Recent studies have placed the 
savings to US growers of 8 existing GM crops at $1.2 
billion, coupled with an increase in yields of 4 billion 
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pounds and a decrease in pesticide use of 46 million 
pounds.65  If approval were secured for 32 other varieties 
currently in the testing stages, the net value to U.S. 
agriculture alone would exceed $2.5 billion in increased 
yields and cost savings.66 The U.S. experience in reducing 
costs and increasing yields with GM crops could be 
transferred to developing countries to play an important 
role in reducing poverty.  A recent study of GM crop farmers 
in South Africa saw them experience significant yield gains 
and chemical cost savings.  In addition, the resulting 
decreased pesticide use allowed the farmers to reduce labor 
costs while realizing associated environmental and health 
benefits.67  These gains were strongest among the smallest 
producers, even with the increased cost of GM seeds, 
illuminating a point pressed by GM supporters that it is the 
poor in the developing world who stand to gain the most from 
the switch to GM crops.68
In spite of these claims, the link between decreased 
production costs and lower prices that is stressed by 
supporters of GMOs in the U.S. biotech and farm industries 
has been disputed by some who feel that investments in more 
traditional agricultural production improvements would 
increase yields at lower costs and without the risks posed 
by biotechnology.69 In any event, promises of economic 
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benefits have not been enough to overcome consumer fears 
regarding the safety of the products elsewhere in the 
world.70  While U.S. consumers have adopted GMO products 
without serious resistance, throughout Europe and elsewhere 
consumer, environmental, and trade groups opposed to GMOs 
have proved successful in mobilizing campaigns directed at 
persuading government authorities to establish strict 
regulatory requirements for GMOs.71 Authorities have 
responded to these concerns with mandatory labeling 
requirements, moratoriums on approval of GM products, even 
outright prohibition of GMOs.72
The result of these negative reactions to GMOs has been 
to set up costly barriers to farmers and biotech industry 
players intent on penetrating these markets with their GM
products.  U.S. agricultural export losses due to stringent 
regulation of GMOs abroad have been high, provoking talk of 
the U.S. bringing WTO dispute proceedings against the E.U. 
over their ban on genetically modified food.73 Export losses 
to the E.U. alone are estimated to cost U.S. companies over 
$4 billion dollars per year.74 In addition, some of the 
larger U.S. food processors, such as Archer Daniels Midland 
(ADM), have announced intentions to reject genetically 
modified crops that are not accepted in the European 
market.75  Prominent food producers around the world have 
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also instituted similar GMO-free policies in order to ensure 
they are not denied access in the global food market.76
While economic losses resulting from a lack of market 
access for GM crops abroad are based on estimations of sales 
lost, many organic and non-GMO farmers have experienced 
financial losses from GMOs of a more local, particularized 
nature.  Buyers in Europe and elsewhere with customers 
fearful of the presence of GMOs often contract with farmers 
to purchase harvests of their crops that have been certified 
GMO-free.77 While these contracts can carry prices up to two 
times the standard commodity price for the crops, the 
contracts are very strict in their GMO-free requirements, 
usually enabling the buyer to terminate the contract if 
testers find the crop to be contaminated with GM seed.78
Owing to the ease with which GM seeds can contaminate non-GM 
fields and grain stores,79maintaining crop purity has been a 
losing battle for many farmers.80  Farmers are often 
devastated as anticipated profits from their costly efforts 
at maintaining non-GM status quickly vanish when crop 
testings reveal their harvests to contain even a fraction of 
GM protein.81
Both Canada and the U.S. have reacted to the special 
purity concerns of organic farmers by adopting certification 
programs to protect the valuable organic market.82 However, 
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these programs are of little use to farmers wishing to sell 
their crops outside North American. Farmers outraged over 
the current situation have initiated widespread class-action 
lawsuits targeting GM developers like Monsanto, Syngenta and 
Pioneer Hi-Bred.83  Attempts to make biotech giants such as 
Monsanto liable for damage caused by their seeds have 
encountered many obstacles, not the least of which are the 
well financed legal defense teams employed by the biotech 
companies.84
Farmers who wish to grow GM crops can’t purchase the 
seeds outright.  Growers must purchase a license (usually 
called a “technology use agreement”) containing strict 
growing guidelines and conditions in addition to disclaimers 
and limited warranties, all designed to limit the biotech 
company’s liability.85  Undaunted, current lawsuits will 
test the boundaries of current statutory and common law 
liability for GMO harm in the U.S. and Canada.  The success 
or failure of their efforts will likely play a large role in 
shaping the debate on whether existing legal standards and 
remedies are capable of adequately balancing societal goals 
with the needs of parties to a GMO dispute.
While most lawsuits to date have attempted to get at 
the bigger pockets of GM seed companies rather than GM 
farmers, GM farmers are not immune from liability for GMO 
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harm.  Lacking clear liability standards regarding GMOs and 
faced with biotech developers’ attempts to contract away 
liability, farmers are looking to the insurance industry for 
protection.  Yet the insurance industry has been slow to 
warm to the prospect of insuring against GMO harms.  Without 
clear indications regarding the full extent of liability 
facing policyholders, insurance companies have had 
difficulty making the risk evaluations necessary to offer 
appropriate coverage.86  While companies are beginning to 
offer insurance policies for both farmers and biotech 
companies potentially liable for damage from GMOs, current 
legal uncertainties ensure the existence of gaps in policy 
coverage and higher policy costs.87  Without clear legal 
liability standards, the long-term viability of GMO based 
policies is difficult to predict.  At present it is safe to 
say that regardless of whether or not GM crops bring about 
cost savings, potential liability for GMO harms, including 
measures to reduce that liability, represent cost increases 
attributable to GM crops.88
Part II
International Rules and Standards Applicable to GMOs
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Effective rules on responsibility and liability 
function so as to encourage prevention as well as 
restoration or compensation.89  The enactment of objective 
standards regarding acceptable conduct enables decision-
makers to make risk/reward choices on a more informed basis.  
By delineating procedural and substantive norms applicable 
in various GMO contexts, authorities give shape to standards 
of liability controlling on parties to a GMO dispute.  It is 
therefore important to understand the regulatory procedures 
of governments and other authoritative bodies, compliance 
with which may serve as an objective indication of 
acceptable behavior.  
     GMOs are subject to national and international 
regulation regarding human health and environmental safety, 
trade, and intellectual property rights.  Rules and 
regulations bearing on liability govern GMOs throughout 
their product cycle.  Currently, most biotechnology 
regulation takes place at the domestic level.90  The 
divergent approaches taken in the U.S. and E.U. to the 
regulation of GMOs are indicative of the lack of 
international consensus on the proper way to deal with the 
challenges and uncertainties of the new technology.  
22
A.  GMO Policy in the United States
Although the United States may have begun its life as a 
European colony, the two cultures have developed different 
attitudes towards acceptance of new technologies, especially 
those with impacts on food.91 Europeans have been more 
skeptical of new technologies and have tended to favor 
traditional foods seen as more closely associated with the 
land.  In contrast, Americans are generally more accepting 
of innovative new technologies promising benefits for 
business and society.92 Whereas GMOs met with distrust upon 
their appearance in the European market, in America they 
were greeted with a presumption of safety.93
The different approaches to food and new technology in 
the E.U. and the U.S. have led to divergent regulatory 
regimes. In the U.S., the focus is on the GMO product alone, 
while the E.U. approaches the GM process itself as one 
requiring added scrutiny.  In order to preserve public and 
industry trust in the regulatory process, the U.S. believes 
that regulatory decisions should be transparent, 
predictable, and based on sound scientific evidence.94 The 
regulatory framework of biotechnology in the U.S. is driven 
by the principle that the final product must be safe.95 It 
is this product-focused approach that is the hallmark of the 
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American system.96 Illustrative of the distinction between 
the product-based U.S. regulatory focus and a process-based 
approach is a statement by the FDA in 1992 regarding 
biotechnology food regulation.  “The regulatory status of a 
food, irrespective of the method by which it is developed, 
is dependent upon objective characteristics of the food and 
the intended use of the food (or its components).”97 The 
idea is that products possessing similar characteristics, 
whether transgenic or conventional, should have their risks 
assessed on an equal basis. The principle is one of 
“substantial equivalence” and is the majority view within 
the scientific community.98
The U.S. has not enacted regulatory measures 
specifically focused on concerns about GMOs.  It has instead 
chosen to regulate GMOs pursuant to their intended use by 
utilizing the capacities of existing federal agencies.99
This structure was set down in 1986 when the Office of 
Science and Technology issued the Coordinated Framework for 
Regulation of Biotechnology.100 The Framework divides the 
regulation of GMOs among three executive agencies: the 
United States Department of Agriculture establishes whether 
GMOs are ‘safe to grow’; the Environmental Protection Agency 
decides if GMOs are ‘safe for the environment’; and the Food 
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and Drug Administration (FDA) determines whether GMOs are 
‘safe to eat’.101
In regulating GM plants, the USDA acts through the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) pursuant 
to congressional authority under the Plant Protection Act of 
2000.102  APHIS regulates the movement, importation, and 
field testing of GMOs via permits and notification 
procedures.103 Before a biotech crop can be field tested, a 
permit must first be secured from APHIS.  Most often this is 
done via a streamlined procedure whereby an applicant must 
notify APHIS prior to moving or field testing a crop.  The 
applicant must provide all relevant information about the 
crop, including likely adverse impacts on the environment, 
target, and non-target species.104 Before the GMO can be 
brought to market, the applicant must submit a petition to 
APHIS showing that field trials have shown the plant to be 
safe.105 If the plant qualifies as safe, APHIS issues a 
“determination of non-regulated status”, meaning the plant 
will be treated like any other plant and can be widely grown 
and commercialized.106 All GMO petitions are published in the 
Federal Register, and the public is given time to comment.107
The EPA derives its regulatory authority over GMOs from 
3 primary sources: the Toxic Substances Control Act 
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(TSCA)108; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)109; and the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).110 TSCA gives the EPA the authority to 
determine if chemical substances (including microorganisms) 
present an unreasonable risk to health and the 
environment.111 Under FIFRA, the EPA evaluates GM crops 
engineered to contain pesticidal properties (such as Bt 
corn), and requires companies to register and label their 
GMOs as pesticides.112  FIFRA also requires companies to 
gather data on the environmental effects of the GMO, 
including its overall pesticide effectiveness, to ensure 
that no ‘unreasonable adverse effects on the environment’ 
occur.
113
 Current EPA regulations require farmers of GM crops 
like Bt corn to devote a percentage of their crop land to 
non-GMO varieties to slow pest resistance.  The regulations 
also encourage farmers to plant non-GMO varieties around the 
edge of their GMO crops in order to create a “buffer zone” 
to protect neighboring fields and habitats.114
If a GM plant contains pesticide chemicals and is 
destined for human consumption, the EPA will regulate it 
under FFDCA.  The FFDCA requires that the EPA establish 
maximum tolerance levels to ensure that “no harm will result 
from all anticipated dietary and other exposures.”115 Most 
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GMOs have been exempted from tolerance requirements after 
extensive safety testing showed public health would not be 
endangered by their consumption.116
The FDA uses the FFDCA as its primary regulatory 
authority over the safety of GM foods.  The FFDCA contains 
provisions governing food additives and adulteration of 
foods.117 In addition, the FFDCA places a legal obligation on 
companies to ensure that any food they sell meets existing 
safety standards.118 In the past, companies wishing to place 
GM food on the market engaged in a voluntary consultation 
process with the FDA to help determine if their product met 
current legal safety standards.119  In consultations, 
companies provided the FDA with data summarizing the 
modifications they had made to their product and why it was 
as safe as conventional food.120 In January of 2001 the FDA 
responded to consumer concerns by proposing that such 
consultations be required of all genetically engineered 
foods.121 The new procedure requires companies to notify the 
FDA at least 120 days before their products are marketed by 
submitting a Pre-Market Biotechnology Notice (PBN) 
containing the same type of data and product information 
previously exchanged during consultations.122 Both the 
initial PBN as well as the FDA response are accessible to 
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the public via the internet.123 The proposal is noteworthy in 
that it still does not require the FDA to either approve a 
GMO before it comes to market or to conduct independent 
tests to determine GMO safety.  Because the FDA views GM 
foods as sufficiently similar to conventional foods, and 
therefore “generally recognized as safe,” no pre-market 
independent testing or approval is required.  The FFDCA uses 
the prospect of criminal liability for introducing an unsafe 
product into the market as assurance that companies will 
conduct responsible research before deciding to 
commercialize a product.124
Because the FDA considers that most food products 
produced from GM ingredients do not differ materially from 
conventional foods, it does not impose mandatory labels on 
GMOs.  Where the use of genetic engineering results in a 
change in food composition, such as the addition of a 
nutritional property or an allergen, then labeling is 
required.125 The crux of the FFDCA labeling requirement is 
that all labeling be truthful and not misleading.  Labels 
need not disclose information solely on the basis of the 
consumers’ desire to know.126  State efforts to require 
mandatory labeling due to consumer concerns were found 
insufficient to justify 1st Amendment restrictions on 
producers’ commercial speech rights.127  In the absence of 
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any cognizable harm, threat to human health or safety, or 
some other substantial government interest, the Constitution 
appears to grant developers of GMOs a right not to speak 
regarding certain information about their product.128
While the United States maintains that its regulatory 
focus on individual products, sound science, and substantial 
equivalence is consistent with the findings of the majority 
of the international scientific community129, its multi-
agency structure has met with substantial criticism.130 Some 
decry the Coordinated Framework as “patchwork” and 
“haphazard.”131 Criticisms focus on inefficiencies and gaps 
created by the system of shared agency responsibilities.132
Because multiple agencies are charged with monitoring 
different aspects of GMOs, there are risks that significant 
harms could “slip through the cracks.”133  These gaps are 
widened in the eyes of many due to the fact that certain 
products do not require approval from each agency, and some 
require no approval at all.134 The lack of comprehensive 
coverage, mandatory agency approval and independent 
scientific testing is seen by many as irresponsibly putting 
the burden on consumers to prove the product is a risk, 
rather than on companies to prove it is safe.135  As 
consumers are deluged with conflicting scientific reports 
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(many of them politically motivated), the transparency 
promoted by the Coordinated Framework’s public access 
provisions does little to promote regulatory confidence.  
Aside from environmental and safety concerns, some see 
the Framework as an economic hindrance. Developers looking 
to bring new products to market must confront a labyrinth of 
different agencies, laws and regulations before getting 
assurance that their product is safe to bring to market.  
Such delays impose expensive opportunity costs for both 
industry and the general public.136  But perhaps the most 
damaging aspect of the U.S. Framework is Congress’ failure 
to effectively assign civil liability for damage to people, 
property or the environment that may result from GMOs.137
While laws such as the FFDCA allow the government to 
institute actions to remedy GMO harms138, they lack 
provisions providing for private causes of action.139 State 
biotech laws likewise have lacked private enforcement 
provisions.140  The result is that private plaintiffs seeking 
a remedy for GMO harms are forced to look primarily to U.S. 
common-law principles to redress their grievances.  
Absent federal preemption in certain areas, state tort 
and contract law principles provide the main vehicles for 
recovery.141  A lack of uniformity in state law can bring 
about contrary results in similar GMO disputes.142  Because 
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of the capacity of GMOs to create widely dispersed harms 
(such as broad environmental damage), state law 
inconsistencies in GMO liability actions could have a 
negative effect on both the proliferation of the technology 
and the affordability of insurance.
While the U.S. regulatory system imposes certain duties 
on GMO manufacturers, contracts provide them with means to 
limit or escape liability. Intellectual property (IP) 
protection is central to contracts regarding the sale and 
planting of GMOs.  Seed companies incur tremendous costs to 
bring new GMO varieties to market, and IP rights help insure 
a return on that investment.143  The United States, in 
keeping with their obligations under international IP 
treaties, offers developers of GM crops a sui generis system 
of IP protection.144 U.S. law allows GM crop developers to 
protect their creations through a combination of patents, 
plant breeder’s rights, and trade secrets.145  These 
protections limit the ability of farmer’s to freely plant GM 
crop varieties, sell or trade GM seed, or to save seeds from 
one year to the next.146  Farmer’s interested in planting GM 
seeds must first enter into a grower’s licensing contract 
with the seed company that specifies the conditions under 
which the farmer may plant GM seeds.147  A farmer who fails 
to adhere to strict “safe handling” contract requirements 
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imposed by the seed company to prevent GM contamination may 
be liable for breach of contract.  Having breached a 
recognized duty of care, the farmer may also be liable to 
neighbors in a tort suit (nuisance, negligence, trespass, 
etc.) for any damage resulting from his crops.148
U.S. contract law authorizes sellers of products to 
disclaim warranties, provide exclusive remedies in the event 
of a breach of contract terms, or bar the recovery of 
consequential damages such as loss of profit.149  While GM 
seed companies can limit their liabilities in some disputes 
through these means, most tort remedies are not extinguished 
by the application of such contractual provisions.150 In 
addition, such provisions are only effective against buyers 
or users of a product, and would not bar tort claims 
instigated by third-party non-users harmed by GMO 
products.151
Interestingly, by aggressively enforcing their IP 
rights in GM seeds, seed companies may be setting themselves 
up for broader liability for GMO harms.  In Monsanto Canada 
Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2001 FCT 256 (Fed. Ct. Canada, 2001), 
Monsanto was able to recover from a 71-year-old Canadian 
farmer who had grown Monsanto’s Roundup Ready soybeans 
without a license.  The farmer claimed the seed had drifted 
into his farm the previous year and contaminated his crop.  
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The trial judge ruled that regardless of how he first 
obtained the seed, Schmeiser continued to use the GM seeds 
after a time when he knew or should have known that such use 
was not permitted.  Schmeiser was forced to pay 
approximately $12,700 to Monsanto.  For those looking to sue 
GM seed companies for damages caused by their GMOs, the 
implication to be drawn from Schmeiser is that if seed 
companies can claim ownership of GMOs regardless of location 
or transfer circumstances, then conceivably they should be 
responsible for any damage they cause.152 In the meantime, 
adherence to the regulatory standards set by governments 
regarding the planting of GM crops will likely prohibit such 
IP related liability arguments from prevailing.153
There are many tort theories that could provide 
remedies suited to various types of GMO damage.154  These 
consist of proportional fault-based or joint and several 
liability schemes (trespass, public or private nuisance, 
negligence, and products liability) as well as strict 
liability.
Tort liability is most likely to arise following a 
situation in which GMOs have escaped the control of an 
operator, resulting in some type of harm.155 The operator 
represents the body exercising legal control over the GMO at 
the relevant time of escape.  This can include a company 
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field-testing a GM crop, a farmer growing GM seeds or 
someone along the distribution channel that has breached a 
duty owed to another.156  Claims based on GM contamination 
and resulting damage originate from a variety of claimants.  
Customers, non-GMO farmers, environmental groups and 
governments are all potential plaintiffs in GMO suits.  
While each theory of recovery presents its own difficulties 
for plaintiffs, one common concern is the difficulty in 
proving causation.  Since GMOs are a new technology, 
scientific understanding of their implications is, in many 
areas such as the environment, relatively uncertain.  
Because multiple factors often combine to cause damage, 
proving that a GMO was a significant cause of harm in a 
given case could be extraordinarily difficult.157 What 
follows is a brief description of the elements necessary to 
establish various tort claims, and their relevance in 
possible GMO actions.
i. Trespass
While trespass claims have historically not enjoyed a 
great deal of prominence in agricultural damage disputes, 
they are often used as a remedy in cases involving airborne 
contaminants, such as pesticides.158  For this reason they 
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may have more applicability to a GMO drift case than the 
more traditional agricultural property damage claims of 
negligence and nuisance.159  In order to sustain a claim of 
trespass, a plaintiff must show that the actions of the 
defendant caused a substantially damaging invasion of 
plaintiff’s property.160 While trespass requires intent, the 
intent can take the form of knowledge that one’s activities 
are likely to invade the plaintiff’s property.  The 
existence of EPA guidelines requesting farmers to plant a 
“buffer zone” around their GM crops, coupled with the 
widespread practice of GMO developers including similar 
conditions in their seed licensing contracts, could be taken 
as evidence that harm from GMO drift is reasonably 
foreseeable.  
The determination of whether a trespass took place does 
not hinge on the size of the intruding element.  Damages 
have been awarded in trespass cases even where invisible 
particles are involved, as long as there is substantial 
damage to the plaintiff.161  Airborne drift of GMO pollen and 
cross-pollination of crops from one farmer’s land to 
another’s could make the operator of the GM crops liable for 
trespass.162 If defendant’s GM seed finds its way onto 
plaintiff’s land and contaminates non-GM crops, that too 
could create a trespass cause of action.  A claimant is 
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still required to show that they themselves did not cause 
the contamination and that it was the defendant’s crop that 
was at fault rather than that of another operator.163
The plaintiff must also present evidence of actual 
damages.  While a small amount of GMO contamination is 
unlikely to cause damage in most instances, there are a few 
situations in which a claimant could show actual harm.  This 
harm could be demonstrated by showing that plaintiff’s land 
is no longer fit for its previous use (such as organic 
farming) or that the GMO presence in the plaintiff’s crops 
resulted in a breach of contract or loss of market access.164
In the end, for a plaintiff to prevail on a trespass claim, 
the convergence of a number of favorable conditions is 
required.  Perhaps the greatest obstacle is that for all of 
the elements of trespass - intent (i.e. knowledge), 
causation, and actual damage - the burden of proof lies with 
the plaintiff.
ii.  Public Nuisance
While trespass focuses on invasion of land that 
interferes with possession, a nuisance claim focuses on 
interference with use and enjoyment.165  The issue is one of 
reasonable use of land under the circumstances.166 While some 
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jurisdictions attempt to balance the gravity of the harm 
against the social utility of the activity in question, 
others “focus more on ad hoc factors demonstrating a 
negative impact on the plaintiff’s interest.”167 Nuisance 
actions can arise out of interference with either the 
public's or a private individual's use and enjoyment of 
land.  Public and private nuisance law provide the common-
law remedies in both instances.
A determination of public nuisance allows the 
government, and in some instances private individuals, to 
recover damages and enjoin activities that unreasonably 
interfere with the rights of the general public.168 In 
determining the presence of a public nuisance, courts must 
consider a number of factors.  These include: (a) whether 
the conduct involves a significant interference with the 
public health, safety or peace, convenience or comfort; (b) 
whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or 
administrative regulation; (c) whether the conduct is of a 
continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long 
lasting effect, and (d) whether the actor knows or has 
reason to know the activity will have a significant effect 
upon the public right.169
In the U.S., public nuisance suits seeking to enjoin 
the sale and planting of GM crops have already been filed 
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against large biotech companies like Monsanto.170 Such suits 
proceed on the theory that GM crops pose an unreasonable and 
significant interference with public rights because the 
companies seeking their introduction into the environment 
have not adequately tested the products for human health and 
environmental safety.171  Threatened injury to the public at 
large can also come from GMO marketing practices threatening 
crop exports to countries that have not approved certain GM 
crop varieties.  A GM seed company that fails to take steps 
to prevent GM seed contamination or to warn growers of the 
economic risks to grain trade associated with commingling of 
GMOs and non-GMO seed could be seen as knowingly interfering 
with the public interest in agricultural trade.172  The GM 
seed industry is responding to these trade related concerns 
by specifying standards of care, such as buffer zones, and 
other programs to avoid commingling.  The industry is also 
considering the prospect of selling only GM varieties that 
have been approved in export markets, as was called for by 
the American Soybean Association.173
Cross-pollination or other contamination of community 
resources with GMOs causing significant environmental or 
ecological damage is the most likely scenario for 
implementing a public nuisance suit for damages.174 Damage 
awards would likely be measured in terms of costs incurred 
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in cleanup and remediation of environmental harms.  In a 
case involving serious and long-standing environmental harm 
allegedly attributed to a GMO175, the state of scientific 
knowledge of a particular GMO’s effects as well as the 
operator’s compliance with U.S. regulatory policy will be 
crucial to the determination of a public nuisance.176  While 
an operator introducing an unapproved GMO variety into the 
environment may be particularly susceptible to public 
nuisance claims, an operator complying with the required 
components of the Coordinated Framework would likely have a 
formidable defense to a public nuisance action.  The lack of 
U.S. regulatory requirements for independent scientific 
testing of GMO effects means that an operator’s research 
finding that the GMO posed no substantial risk to the 
environment could (in the absence of a showing of negligence 
in conducting the research) also serve as a public nuisance 
defense. 
Even assuming that these defenses are overcome, in 
order for a plaintiff to recover damages under public 
nuisance doctrine the harm must be proven.177  While genetic 
marking tests may reveal a particular GMO to be a suspect in 
a case, environmental and ecological damage usually result 
from a multitude of factors, scientific understanding of 
which is limited.  Coupled with the variety of operators 
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exercising varying degrees of control over GMOs at relevant 
stages, the attribution of damage to a GMO and 
responsibility to an operator can be extremely difficult to 
establish.  
In the event a plaintiff succeeds against an operator 
in a public nuisance suit for damages, apportionment of 
liability will vary across jurisdictions.  In a strictly 
fault-based liability state, the GMO operator is only liable 
for damages proportional to their degree of fault.  Where 
many parties play a role in exercising control over GMOs, 
proving fault of each relevant party in order to recover the 
full costs of damage brings added legal burdens and costs 
into nuisance litigation.  One defendant’s insolvency or 
lack of insurance can lead to taxpayer dollars having to 
fill the gaps between the cost of remedying the damage and 
the amount recoverable from defendants.  In states imposing 
a system of joint and several liability, these problems are 
averted by allowing plaintiffs to recover the full extent of 
damage from any of the defendants.  In the GMO context, this 
would most likely leave wealthy biotech companies exposed to 
the full costs of liability regardless of their degree of 
fault.  
While advantageous to the plaintiff from a cost 
recovery standpoint, (likely the government – i.e. taxpayers 
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- in a public nuisance suit) equitable concerns as well as 
the resulting disincentive to invest in socially useful 
technologies caution against wide application of the joint 
and several liability standard.  While GMO defendants found 
fully liable for environmental damage may thereafter sue co-
defendants to recover costs, in most instances this will 
amount to a biotech company suing another GMO operator, such 
as a farmer or distributor, whose lack of financial 
resources may make such efforts unprofitable.  However, in a 
joint and several liability system allowing defendants to an 
initial suit the ability to demonstrate a lesser degree of 
fault in order to escape full liability, these concerns are 
mitigated.  Placing the burden on defendants to show that 
they were not at fault lessens the costs of litigation to 
the plaintiff, while preserving for careful defendants the 
opportunity to prove they should not have to bear the full 
costs of remedying GMO damage not attributable to them.  In 
a situation in which there has been harm despite full 
compliance with regulatory guidelines, forcing the public to 
bear the costs of any shortfalls in cost recovery appears 
more equitable.
iii.  Private Nuisance
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A private nuisance action gives private parties the 
ability to obtain injunctions and receive damages for an 
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of 
their personal property.178 Genetic drift, cross-pollination, 
and commingling of GMOs with non-GM varieties offer the 
greatest potential for plaintiffs such as neighboring 
farmers to institute a private nuisance suit. Many courts 
have been willing to impose private nuisance liability in 
the absence of intent, and still others recognize nuisance 
simply as a condition in need of adjustment, rendering the 
defendant’s degree of care immaterial.179 These developments 
make it easier for plaintiffs to sustain private nuisance 
actions against GMOs regardless of either their social 
utility or the implementation of operator safeguards.  Some 
U.S. states have enacted “right to farm” laws codifying the 
“coming to the nuisance” defense in agricultural settings.  
However, many of these laws will not insulate farmers 
engaged in negligent actions (failure to employ a buffer 
zone could arguably be deemed negligent under certain 
circumstances), and some have been declared unconstitutional 
under state law.180
A farmer seeking an injunction to prevent a neighboring 
landowner from planting GM crops will likely have a 
difficult time succeeding, as U.S. courts are hesitant to 
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enjoin otherwise legal actions without proof that harm will 
result.181  Although the loss of organic status or access to 
export markets can serve as evidence of potential economic 
harm, these dangers can be mitigated by the defendant 
landowner’s implementation of safeguards such as crop buffer 
zones.  While a court may be receptive to an injunction suit 
to require that such insulating procedures be undertaken, it 
is unlikely that a court would enjoin the defendant from 
planting legally approved GM seed.  This leaves a vulnerable 
party to rely on a remedy of damages in the event of GMO 
harm.
The use of a private nuisance suit to recover damages 
to property caused by a GMO can be likened to actions in 
other agricultural settings.  Many states have used nuisance 
suits to deal with situations involving airborne 
contaminants such as pesticides and other farm chemicals 
that present an analogous situation to the danger of 
property damage from GMOs.182 If a farmer plants GM crops 
without employing a buffer zone, a plaintiff may have a 
cause of action for negligent nuisance.  Such a claim will 
require a showing that defendant’s actions were 
unreasonable, and compliance with regulatory standards may 
offer an adequate defense.  Where the defendant was under a 
contractual duty to employ certain safeguards, the plaintiff 
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may find it easier to prevail on a claim of intentional 
nuisance.183  The loss of organic certification, and 
resulting loss of profits, could provide the basis for 
private nuisance damages in such a situation.184
Private nuisance suits may also be employed against GM 
seed companies who fail to disclose to producers the risks 
to their exports posed by commingling of GM and non-GM 
varieties.  Companies that fail to prescribe proper safe 
handling guidelines for growers may also be subject to 
private nuisance suits by neighbors seeking to recover for 
lost sales from GM seed contamination.185
iv. Negligence
One who fails to act reasonably under the 
circumstances, and whose failure causes harm to another, may 
be liable in a negligence action.  In order to establish a 
claim of negligence, a plaintiff will be required to show: 
(1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to 
protect the plaintiff from harm; (2) a breach of that duty 
by the defendant; and (3) actual injury to the plaintiff 
caused by defendant’s failure.186  The difficulties in 
proving the traditional elements of a negligence cause of 
action - duty, breach, causation and injury – confine the 
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negligence remedy to those circumstances where a defendant 
is likely to be found to have failed to act reasonably in 
performing their duty.187  The pervasiveness of buffer zones 
and other containment safeguards in GM grower’s license 
contracts, as well as the U.S. regulatory recommendations 
for implementation of such practices, likely indicate that 
GM contamination of neighboring fields is reasonably 
foreseeable.188  This knowledge likely places a duty of care 
on the grower to take acceptable precautions to prevent such 
harm.  The failure of a GMO operator to enact reasonable 
safeguards to prevent cross-contamination may be grounds for 
a negligence action when such contamination causes actual 
harm to a plaintiff.189 A defendant complying with 
contractual or regulatory guidelines is less likely to be 
found to have breached a duty of care.190  Even where a 
breach has occurred, a plaintiff will still be faced with 
the difficulty of proving the defendant’s GMO caused the 
harm.191  Proof of actual harm can also be hard to establish.  
Some states require harm to physical property, not mere 
economic loss, to recover in a negligence action.192  Where 
the numerous burdens required to sustain a successful 
negligence claim appear too difficult for a plaintiff to 
overcome, a products liability cause of action may be an 
appropriate alternative remedy.
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v. Products Liability
GM seed companies which fail to alert buyers or growers 
to the risks posed by GMOs may be liable in a products 
liability action.193 Products liability may also provide a 
remedy in instances where damages are due to a defect in the 
GMO itself.194 A company’s failure to notify operators of 
GMOs that their products may cross-pollinate with non-GMO 
varieties, and how to prevent such occurrences, could lead 
to a determination that the product contained inadequate 
instructions and was therefore defective.  Of note is that
where GMOs exhibit pesticidal properties, state tort claims 
premised on inadequate labeling may be preempted by 
compliance with FIFRA requirements.195 A manufacturer who 
makes negligent or intentional misrepresentations to 
regulators or buyers regarding the safety of their product 
or its fitness for a particular use may be responsible for 
damages in a products liability action.  For example, if 
farmers planting StarLink corn that had not been approved 
for human consumption were not told of its status by 
Aventis, the manufacturer, they could commence a products 
liability action to recover the resulting decrease in 
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marketability of their crop.196  A GMO destined for consumers 
that failed to warn of an allergen could also provide the 
vehicle for a successful products liability action.197
While some producers may be subject to strict liability 
for harms caused by their product, a number of fault-based 
exceptions can allow producers to escape full 
responsibility.  These include: compliance with applicable 
laws and rules; utilization of the best available scientific 
technology (BAT) or evidence to determine product safety; 
and a showing that the product was not defective when placed 
on the market.  In addition, the consumer must prove the 
existence of the product defect, actual injury, and the 
causal nexus between the two.
vi. Strict Liability
Strict liability operates to hold a defendant liable 
for harm resulting from their activities regardless of the 
defendant’s degree of fault.  Equity concerns as well as the 
lack of a deterrent element have historically restricted the 
application of strict liability to defendants engaged in 
activities recognized as “abnormally dangerous.”198  Given 
the growing presence of GM crops in agriculture199 and the 
lack of a U.S. regulatory ban on GM crops, it is unlikely 
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that a court would determine the practice is abnormally 
dangerous.  A plaintiff alleging harm from an approved GMO 
variety will likely be required to show fault, but where an 
unapproved GM variety is the source of harm, strict 
liability may apply.200
Some courts have been willing to look to the character 
of the surrounding land use in determining whether an 
activity is abnormally dangerous.201 In the case of chemical 
sprayings, most courts require proof of operator negligence 
before awarding damages.202  However, a defendant who sprays 
herbicide on their property resulting in damage to a 
neighboring landowner’s crops can be held subject to strict 
liability.203  Crop dusting can also entail strict liability 
for harms to neighboring property.204 The benefits to the 
spraying farmer of increased crop yields may not justify the 
damage to the neighbor’s crops.205
These approaches to harmful airborne chemical 
contaminants can be likened to the dangers posed by GMO 
drift and other airborne methods of GM contamination.  
Accordingly, a farmer planting GM crops in the hope of 
increased yields may be strictly liable for GMO damage to 
neighboring landowners.206  While property law usually 
upholds a landowner’s right to make lawful use of their 
property, a farmer planting GM crops in an area dominated by 
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organic farmers may be introducing an “alien substance” and 
engaging in “ultrahazardous activity” justifying the 
imposition of strict liability.207  By subjecting their 
organic farming neighbors to risks that they themselves are 
not reciprocally subjected to, the GMO farmer’s practices 
may create a risk imbalance that can best be handled 
applying a strict liability standard.208
While classifying GMOs as an abnormally dangerous 
activity may be justified in certain narrow instances, 
specialized economic harms are unlikely to justify broad 
scale imposition of strict liability on GMO operators absent 
clear scientific evidence demonstrating the unreasonable 
health or environmental risks of GM crops.
B.  GMO Policy in the European Union
E.U. policy decisions regarding GMO products are as 
focused on the processes used to produce the products as 
they are with the products themselves.209  This “process” 
approach is in contrast to the American “product” approach 
reliance on “substantial equivalence.”  The close European 
connection to traditional food production processes, 
combined with a historical and cultural distrust of 
biotechnology, have led to greater skepticism in Europe over 
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the safety of foods produced through genetic engineering.210
In response to this skepticism, E.U. GMO decisions are 
guided by application of the precautionary principle.211
A fixture in numerous environmental treaties,212 the 
precautionary principle holds that scientific uncertainty 
regarding potentially dangerous health or environmental 
effects from GMOs should not preclude action being taken in 
order to prevent harm.213 While seemingly benign, the scope 
of the principle has historically been ill defined, leading 
to criticism that its application to GMOs and other products 
constitutes an arbitrary and discriminatory barrier to 
trade.214 As the E.U. strives toward a precautionary approach 
incorporating more fixed standards to guide regulatory 
decisions,215 stringent regulation of GMOs at the Community 
level continues.  The fears expressed through the 
application of the precautionary principle have blossomed 
into a regulatory structure that treats products produced by 
genetic processes as “novel goods,” a special category in 
need of unique regulation.216 Community harmonization of 
member state law in this area is accomplished primarily 
through the use of “regulations” and “directives”.217
E.U. regulations are community-wide legislative 
proposals setting forth legal obligations binding on Member 
50
States.  These proposals are directly applicable in Member 
States and specify not only the ends to be achieved, but the 
means by which to achieve them.  In contrast, Directives 
specify the ends to be achieved, but allow the member states 
flexibility regarding the means employed to achieve these 
ends under their national legal systems.218 Directives have 
emerged as the favored means of E.U legislative action 
through application of the “subsidiarity” principle, which 
proposes to limit Community action to areas where measures 
cannot sufficiently be undertaken by Member States alone.219
The first major E.U. legislative proposal to deal with 
GMOs came in 1990 with the passage of Council Directive 
90/220.220  Directive 90/220 was enacted in response to the 
demands of European biotechnology companies distraught by 
the complex web of Member State regulatory regimes that they 
believed disadvantaged them with respect to their foreign 
competitors.221 Directive 90/220 and its 2001 replacement, 
Directive 2001/18,222 harmonized Community procedures for GMO 
approval and market access.223 “Novel foods” legislation in 
the form of Council Regulation 258/97 was enacted to cover 
sterile products derived from GMOs, including novel foods 
consisting of, containing, or produced from but not 
containing GMOs.224
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Before a company can release a GMO into the territory 
of a Member State, they must notify the Member State’s 
competent authority.  The notification must provide the 
authorizing party with all significant information about the 
GMO, including a detailed risk assessment report225 and a 
technology profile revealing the GMO’s relevant 
properties.226 If the Member State’s authorities approve the 
company’s GMO in the specified ninety-day time period, they 
forward the company’s application to the European 
Commission, which distributes it to all Member States for 
feedback.  If no Member State objects, the Member State 
originally notified may place the GMO on the market, and it 
may thereafter be used throughout the Community without 
requiring further notification.227  A GMO has never been 
unanimously approved by all Member States.228
Member State objections to the placing on the market of 
a specific GMO variety prompt a dispute resolution process.  
The process requires a committee of Member State 
representatives to give qualified majority approval to a 
Community-wide release.  Failing committee approval, the 
proposal is forwarded to the Council.  If three months pass 
and the GMO proposal has not been rejected by a qualified 
majority of the Council, it is sent to the Commission to be 
approved for Community release.229 Before the E.U. issued its 
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current moratorium on GMO approvals in June of 1999, only 
fourteen GMOs were approved under Directive 90/220.  This is 
in stark contrast to the 58 GMOs currently approved for 
market in the U.S.230
In addition to the arduous approval procedure, GMOs 
currently available in the E.U. are stringently regulated by 
a variety of Community-wide legal instruments.231 Mandatory 
labeling and Member State notification are required by the 
E.U. before any product containing GMOs can be placed on the 
market.232 Recognizing the difficulties non-GMO producers 
face in segregating their products from GMOs, any product 
containing less than a one percent “adventitious presence” 
of GM soya or maize material need not carry a label alerting 
consumers that the product contains GMOs.233
Issues concerning the scope of Community intellectual 
property protection for GM plant varieties are settled 
primarily by the European Patent Office.  As signatories to 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement, all E.U. states are obligated to 
provide IP protection for GM plant varieties either through 
patents or an effective sui generis system.234 These IP 
protections impact GMO contract terms and private party 
rights in much the same manner as in the U.S., and govern 
party liability absent legal codes, statutes or public 
policy justifications to the contrary.  
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While liability for GMO harms can vary greatly 
depending on how circumstances are dealt with under Member 
State law, liability principles in some areas have been
defined on a Community-wide basis.  These areas include E.U. 
products liability law, as well as environmental liability 
proposals currently under legislative consideration.235
GMO liability for harms to the health or property of 
E.U. consumers may be best dealt with under Community 
products liability law.  Producer liability for defective 
products is governed by Council Directive 85/374/EEC, as 
amended by Council Directive 1999/34/EC.236 These directives 
allow the Member States to utilize their existing civil and 
common law remedies to distribute liability in accordance 
with the directive’s requisite standards.  Directive 
1999/34/EC imposes strict liability on producers for harms 
to consumers and their property, with joint and several 
liability applied when multiple producers are involved.237
The “producer” liable for a defective product may include: 
any party whose name or trade markings grace the products 
packaging; the product’s importer; any party involved in the 
production process; or the seller of the product in the 
event the producer cannot be identified.  The plaintiff 
carries the burden of proof with respect to demonstrating 
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actual harm, the existence of a defect in the product, and 
the causal relationship between the harm and the defect.238
Exemptions from strict liability may apply in certain 
cases, including situations where the defect is due to 
compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued 
by the public authorities; the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time the product was put into 
circulation was not such as to enable the defect to be 
discovered (Member States legislation may derogate on this 
point); and where the defect causing the damage was not 
present when the product was placed on the market.239 The 
Directive also contains a three-year statute of limitations 
on claims as well as a liability cap allowance of not less 
than ECU 70 million.  
Interestingly, due to the extensive E.U. approval 
process, (detailed labeling and disclosure requirements, 
independent Member State risk assessments) plaintiffs 
seeking to hold the manufacturer of a Community-approved GMO 
liable for it’s harms appear less likely to prevail than in 
the U.S.  For example, a company whose GMO produced an 
unanticipated allergic reaction after undergoing thorough 
EFSA and Member State evaluations appears better equipped to 
demonstrate they took every reasonable precaution to guard 
against adverse product effects.  The consent to release of 
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the GMO by Member State authorities would appear to be a 
more persuasive exemption from strict products liability in 
the E.U. than in the U.S., given the U.S. regulatory 
reliance on company “product stewardship”240 to provide 
assurances of product safety.  Harm to private property from 
defective GMOs, such as soil damage or crop damage, could 
also provide the basis for E.U. products liability actions, 
provided the property was used primarily for private use and 
consumption.241
Economic damages such as consequential damages 
associated with the loss of crop certification or contract 
profits fall outside the scope of damages recoverable under 
85/374/EEC.  Directive 85/374/EEC only allows recovery for 
damage to property “intended for private use or 
consumption,”242 so Member State municipal legal principles 
(tort law, civil code provisions, etc.) likely provide the 
best opportunity to recover GMO damage to commercial 
interests.243
The E.U. is currently in the process of refining a 
proposal to harmonize Member State law in regards to 
environmental liability that would apply to damage caused by 
GMOs.244  The E.U. considers this legislation to be a pre-
requisite to lifting the current ban on new GMO approvals.245
The objective of the current proposal is to “establish a 
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common framework for the prevention and remedying of 
environmental damage at a low cost to society.”246  In 
pursuit of that goal, the proposal attempts to clarify the 
scope of environmental damage to be remedied, as well as 
proper standards of liability to be applied in various 
instances.247 The proposal purports to embody the "polluter 
pays" principal, which holds that the party responsible for 
creating the environmental harm or risk of harm should be 
forced to bear the costs of prevention, cleanup, and 
restoration.  
Many environmental groups had hoped that a "polluter 
pays" approach to the proposal would contain the following 
standards, among others: (1) hold operators strictly liable 
for damage they cause, regardless of regulatory compliance; 
(2) require operators to procure environmental damage 
insurance or contribute to the establishment of a financial 
guarantee in case of operator insolvency; (3) define 
environmental damage broadly to encompass biodiversity 
damage to non-protected areas; (4) apply retroactively; and 
(5) establish private rights to compensation in the event of 
economic loss caused by environmental damage. 
The current proposal fulfills none of those hopes, 
instead providing a system where companies can pursue 
ventures without fear of extensive liability regardless of 
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fault.  Nonetheless, it is intended to act as a baseline 
level of protection, allowing Member States to apply more 
stringent regulations.248  More stringent laws could allow 
for additional liable parties, varying cost apportionment, 
and broader environmental coverage than that described in 
the proposed Directive.249  For example, under the Directive, 
operators liable for damage can include anyone exercising 
control over the GMO.  Municipal legislation might eliminate 
farmers from the definition of "operator" in the GMO 
context, thus leaving GMO developers as the only responsible 
parties under national law and forcing them to rely on 
specific fault-based exceptions to extinguish their 
liability.
Under the current directive proposal, each Member State 
is required to designate an authority responsible for the 
assessment and cleanup of environmental damage.250
Environmental damage is defined to include serious adverse 
consequences to biodiversity conservation, as well as 
potential or actual harm to the public as a result of soil 
or subsoil contamination.251  The directive will exclude 
damage of a widespread or diffuse character that does not 
allow for the establishment of a causal link between 
operator and harm.252  When damage or the threat of damage is 
identified, either by private parties or the designated 
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authority, the authority can either request the operator to 
take action, or it can take action itself and then recover 
costs from the operator.253  The operator will be liable for 
the costs of prevention, cleanup, and recovery, as well as 
the costs associated with the assessment of damage.254
Multiple operator liability under the directive may be 
addressed via a joint and several or a fault based scheme.255
Many exceptions work to relieve an operator of 
liability, including using BAT, acting in accordance with 
current scientific knowledge, and complying with applicable 
permits and legal requirements.256  A five-year statute of 
limitations will bar latent claims.257  Where damage is to 
biodiversity, fault must be shown before a party will be 
held liable.258  Insurance is encouraged, rather than 
required, and Member States retain the option to establish a 
financial mechanism to assist in remedying damage in the 
event the operator is insolvent or no operator can be 
identified.259  The directive will neither apply 
retroactively,260 nor create private rights to compensation 
for economic losses.261
Many environmental groups feel the proposal's limited 
scope and numerous exceptions will in practice fail to hold 
operators liable for damage they cause.  The inclusion of an 
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“authorized use” exception from operator liability262could 
prove problematic, forcing the issuing government to play 
the dual roles of prosecutor and defendant in an 
environmental liability action.  Even where the government 
decides to act to restore an area damaged by an operator in 
compliance, taxpayers, not the operator, will pay the 
costs.263  Government and industry, however, see it as an 
important practical step to encourage responsible economic 
growth, as well as one that will foster closer 
industry/regulatory cooperation and accountability.  The 
proposed directive allows GMO operators to pursue action 
with enormous potential social utility with the assurance 
that their good faith efforts to ensure product safety will 
not subject them to devastating liability costs.  By 
restricting the scope of liability to situations involving 
significant environmental damage, with damages valued at the 
costs of ecological restoration,264 insurance markets are 
better able to evaluate the risk of policyholder liability.  
This contributes to more affordable insurance premiums, 
especially for GMO companies that can demonstrate to 
insurers that their products are unlikely to cause 
significant or concentrated harms.
The specific environmental risks posed by GMOs, such as 
gene flow and loss of habitat or biodiversity, are unlikely 
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to be addressed within the ambit of the proposed directive.  
While genetic marker technology may allow authorities to 
trace the diffuse harms to biodiversity posed by GMOs, it 
remains unclear how the existence of “serious adverse 
effects” to biodiversity will be determined.  The limited 
definition of biodiversity contained in the directive does 
not address harms to areas not designated for protection or 
conservation under either Community instruments or national 
law.265  Even in the event the competent authority identifies 
a causal nexus between a GMO and serious adverse effects on 
biodiversity, significantly damaging ecological impacts are 
unlikely to be discovered within the directive’s five-year 
claim limitation.  
In addition, those attempting to hold operators liable 
for harms to biodiversity must prove operator fault.  
“Authorized use” exceptions aside, establishing the extent 
to which a GMO is at fault in an ecological disaster will be 
extremely difficult, creating expensive “deep pockets” 
litigation involving competing expert scientific opinions.  
The costs of such litigation divert resources away from the 
bio-remediation efforts – assuming such efforts are both 
viable and capable of accurate valuation.266 In the event 
harm to biodiversity is identified, authorities may be 
reluctant to take action due to the complexity of the task 
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and the lack of certainty that costly efforts will prove 
successful in restoring ecological damage.  While operators 
can be forced to contribute to the costs of alternative 
cleanup and restoration efforts when authorities deem such 
action more practicable, this is of limited effect in 
dealing with GMO damage.  The biological nature of GMO harms 
increase the danger that if a specific situation is not
remedied its effects will have much broader implications 
than, for instance, a chemical spill or other environmental 
harms more easily contained.  
Failure to hold operators liable for long-term, broad 
scale damage to biodiversity puts added pressure on 
regulatory authorities charged with protecting the 
environment to ensure GMO products are safe.  Since 
authorities such as the EFSA are unlikely to be as 
knowledgeable about a product’s risks as the developer, 
approvals of new varieties will be slowed while regulators 
institute long and costly risk assessments more suitably 
undertaken by the GMO developer.  This creates an 
inefficient allocation of costs without added assurances of 
safety, as well as increased disruption of trade.  
While it is acceptable to note that long-term harm may 
not be foreseeable by any party, and that society should 
bear the costs associated with scientific endeavors 
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promising broad social benefits, five-years is a rather 
abrupt time period in which to identify and assess 
ecological damage from GMO endeavors.  By giving carte 
blanche to operators complying with the terms of acceptable 
use, companies have less incentive to undertake preventative 
measures or pursue a policy of “product stewardship.”267
Thankfully, operators acting in a negligent manner will not 
be excused from liability by complying with applicable 
regulatory guidelines.  Because operators are unlikely to 
risk facing the extensive liability implications of acting 
without the needed regulatory consent, the net effect of the 
proposed directive is to elevate individual Member State 
negligence law will to the de facto standard for GMO 
operator liability.  While hardly harmonized throughout the 
E.U., an assessment of negligence law principles applied in 
various jurisdictions allows parties to ascertain the 
acceptable standards of care needed to reduce actor 
uncertainty and encourage safe practices.  Given current 
levels of scientific ecological understanding, perhaps 
evolving negligence law principles are the only practical 
way to balance the cost allocations associated with the 
benefits and risks of GMOs.  
As insurance markets gain experience with pricing risks 
liability policies tailored to the GMO industry should 
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become more affordable and directly accessible in actions to 
recover cleanup and recovery costs.  In time, insurance 
innovations such as secondary markets for risk trading and 
securitization, mandatory environmental liability insurance, 
and financial responsibility requirements (FRRs) can help 
ensure that the full costs of broad scale ecological damage 
from GMOs are not borne solely by the public.268
C. Multi-Lateral Instruments Shaping GMO Liability Rules
While individual nations often take vastly different 
regulatory approaches to GMOs,269 the importance of GMOs to 
world agricultural trade and development goals means that 
international agreements and institutions increasingly play 
a larger role in determining the scope of GMO regulations in 
their party nations.270 Foremost among these international 
regimes is the World Trade Organization (WTO), a body 
containing the principal players in the biotechnology 
sphere.  While “(t)here are currently over 30 ongoing 
multilateral discussions concerning biotechnology”271, the 
WTO functions as the primary body charged with resolving 
disputes affecting international trade.272  These disputes 
comprise a wide range of trade related issues including 
acceptability of certain safety regulations, denials of 
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market access, and protection of intellectual property 
rights.273
Within the WTO structure, three side agreements – the 
TBT, SPS, and TRIPS Agreements – play a sizeable role in 
establishing acceptable regulatory standards applicable to 
GMOs.274  WTO Dispute Panel decisions interpreting these 
agreements in conjunction with relevant provisions of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (most notably GATT 
Article XX exceptions) can have a large effect on national 
GMO regulatory policy.275  Nations unwilling to conform their 
regulatory policies to acceptable WTO standards can find 
themselves facing diminished trade prospects and the 
suspension of valuable tariff concessions. In comparison to 
other international agreements hampered by ineffective 
enforcement provisions, the WTO has often been able to bring 
Member nation policies into compliance with its 
requirements.276
The harmonizing of regulatory guidelines in order to 
conform to interpretations of WTO side agreements can 
contribute greatly to the promulgation of applicable 
liability standards for GMOs.  Such harmonization, however, 
can only take place if the WTO retains its position as the 
acknowledged moderator of global trading conditions, an 
outcome that looks increasingly less likely by the day.277
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Assuming the continued vitality of the WTO, the dispute 
settlement process has so far proved incapable of resolving 
the impasse created by applications of the precautionary 
principle to justify trade-distorting import bans.278  The 
long-term viability of the current incarnation of the 
precautionary principle is threatened, as the principle is 
likely to be a central component of future WTO disputes.  In 
fact, the U.S. has recently indicated that it intends to 
follow through on its threat to institute WTO dispute 
proceedings against the E.U.  The complaint will allege that 
the E.U. de facto GMO approval ban, enacted pursuant to E.U. 
precautionary principle interpretation, amounts to an 
unjustifiable trade barrier.279  Prior WTO cases contesting 
arbitrary or discriminatory E.U. application of the 
principle(“Beef Hormones”)280 suggest a U.S. victory.281
Current international standards providing the basis for 
measures qualifying as “scientifically justified” exceptions 
to GATT rules can be found within the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (Codex) standards on food safety, pesticide 
residues, and science-based risk assessments,282 and the 
plant health standards of the International Plant Protection 
Convention.283 The standards set forth in these sources do 
not support the existing precautionary principle risk 
assessment policies undertaken by the E.U. regarding GMOs.284
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Current international standards support a product, not 
process, regulatory focus with an emphasis on science-based 
risk analysis building on the concept of substantial 
equivalence.285 While the WTO allows the E.U. to maintain a 
higher level of protection in instances where the 
international standard fails to offer an “appropriate level 
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection,”286 the E.U. 
currently has no sufficient scientific evidence of adverse 
health effects to justify their ban.287  Article XX(g) may 
allow the E.U. to claim biodiversity as a natural resource 
in need of protection, but the lack of discernable limits on 
such a justification, as well as the limited definition 
given to biodiversity in the current E.U. Proposed Directive 
on Environmental Liability, undermine the persuasiveness of 
this interpretation.  Given the immense political opposition 
to biotech foods in the E.U., bucking international 
standards is of little consequence to officials in charge of 
setting regulatory policy.  Regardless of the outcome of any
WTO GMO dispute, relenting under WTO pressure is not a 
political option for E.U. leaders.288
The prevalence of the precautionary principle in 
environmental treaties such as the Cartegena Protocol to the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), and the E.U.’s obligation 
to honor the commitments imposed on it by those treaties, 
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point to the need for greater clarification of the criteria 
used in the principle’s application.289  Added transparency 
and scientific underpinnings to the principle can help to 
distinguish health and environmental caution from 
protectionism, thereby allowing the dual international goals 
of biosecurity and trade promotion to coexist.
Alongside precautionary health and environmental 
objections are the legitimate economic concerns of the 
developing world.  The TRIPS obligation to grant either 
patents and plant breeder’s rights or sui generis protection 
to GMO varieties may be seen as too large a risk to the long 
term sustainable agricultural survival of many developing 
country farmers.  Governments unwilling to see their small 
farmers run out of business by large agricultural companies 
(as allegedly occurred in many developing countries 
following the “Green Revolution” of the 1970’s) may ban the 
sale or importation of GM seeds.290 The flexibility of 
current WTO instruments to handle trade restrictions imposed 
as a means to safeguard cultural heritage or economic 
development goals is uncertain, and efforts to dismantle 
developing country efforts at maintaining needed farmer 
security will no doubt instigate more debilitating anti-WTO 
protests.
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International agencies such as Codex are working 
hard to standardize acceptable approaches to GMO risk 
assessments in order to ensure a greater degree of State 
regulatory uniformity.291   While the standards are nearly 
set, states must adopt them in practice in order for GMO 
operators to have clear guidance on appropriate standards of 
care, including the level of regulatory compliance required 
to exempt them from liability.  To the extent states 
continue to maintain fractured regulatory approaches to 
GMOs, liability principles will be divergent and uncertain.
Part III
Conclusions and Recommendations
Genetically modified organisms have the potential to 
generate severe adverse effects on human health and the 
environment while simultaneously creating numerous trade and 
financial difficulties.  But the contributions that GMOs can 
make to a healthier, more sustainable future are enormous.  
No single regulatory structure is appropriate to tackle the 
diverse concerns presented by GMOs, and no single set of 
liability principles can effectively balance the rights and 
obligations of parties in the vast array of GMO dispute 
contexts.  An effective liability system is but one 
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necessary component in an inter-related approach to dealing 
with the perils and promises of biotechnology.  
A successful approach must combine efforts in the areas 
of research, risk assessment, risk management, 
commercialization and release, monitoring, and dispute 
resolution.  Because liability standards only come into 
consideration following a breakdown in another area of 
focus, their principles are necessarily a function of the 
cost/benefit allocations that have taken place along the GMO 
continuum.  
In the coming years, as states attempt to elaborate 
international rules and procedures in respect of liability 
for domestic and transboundary GMO harms,292 greater 
familiarity with the implications of the technology will 
help to settle many of the perplexities plaguing current GMO 
harmonization efforts.  The new Codex standards for risk 
assessment demonstrate that the international scientific 
community is rejecting the E.U. regulatory focus on process 
in favor of the product-focus approach favored in the U.S.  
Broad international acceptance of standards such as these 
can bring the clarity and transparency needed to distinguish 
scientific justifications for GMO policy from protectionist 
ones.
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Further clarifications of vague standards such as the 
precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle will 
assist in the development of regulatory frameworks that 
offer more guidance to GMO operators on appropriate 
standards of care.  International agreements delineating the 
scope of environmental harms that trigger operator liability 
are also required.  Harms to broad concepts such as 
biodiversity or habitat will need to be defined in greater 
detail so as that objective cost valuations can be 
determined.  An intergovernmental task force on 
biotechnology harms, under UN or WTO auspices, can assist in 
refining such concepts.  For now, the standards set forth in 
the proposed E.U. directive are sufficient.  Either the 
costs incurred in preventing an imminent environmental 
danger, or those expended during cleanup and restoration can 
serve as benchmarks for the assessment of damages.  
As more states build the institutional and technical 
capacities necessary to evaluate the risks posed by GMOs, 
the international community will undoubtedly need to exhibit 
greater co-operation regarding safety assessments, product 
labeling requirements, and monitoring.  State development 
and implementation of mechanisms tailored to GMOs akin to 
those in the CBD and the Cartegena Protocol can speed the 
development of liability principles.  
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Mechanisms such as a one-stop Bio-Clearinghouse for 
non-sterile GMOs and a streamlined advanced informed 
agreement (AIA) protocol for securing operator and importing 
government consent to a GMO release can provide baseline 
procedures to evaluate both a GM variety’s environmental 
safety and a GMO operator’s acceptance of appropriate use 
guidelines.  The Bio-Clearinghouse could be responsible for 
independently determining the relative environmental safety 
of a new GM variety.  It should provide conditions of 
acceptable use for new GMO varieties as a component of its 
evaluation.  In order to safeguard threats to habitat loss 
and biodiversity, conditions can include zoning requirements 
prohibiting the planting of GMO varieties in close proximity 
to wild relatives to reduce the risk of gene flow, as well 
as buffer zone or terminator seed ring requirements.293
Where States feel their environments are particularly 
susceptible to the risks of harm posed by a GMO variety, 
they can present their justifications to the Clearinghouse 
for its review, and ask permission to modify the baseline 
conditions of use to better accommodate their respective 
environment.  Any operator complying with the terms under 
which consent to release is granted receives an exemption 
from liability similar to that contained in the proposed 
E.U. Environmental Liability Directive.  Those operators 
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acting outside the bounds of acceptable use will be subject 
to liability either on the basis of fault or under a joint 
and several apportionment, allowing for diminished liability 
where an operator can establish they did not contribute to 
the full extent of the harm.  
The AIA can be used to minimize the dangers of 
transboundary harm arising where a use acceptable in one 
state is objectionable to a neighbor state.  Bordering 
states can fund a mutual bio-remediation response authority 
charged with monitoring terms of use and preventative 
measures, as well as undertaking necessary cleanup efforts.  
This can be funded through public funds or industry 
contributions.  The authority can take the necessary 
immediate action and recover costs from the responsible 
operators where such action would be feasible.
By giving GMO operators fixed standards of care by 
which to abide, insurance companies will be better able to 
evaluate risks posed by individual policyholders and offer 
insurance plans tailored to their needs.  GMO damage 
insurance can be mandated by countries lacking the funds to 
provide an adequate governmental response and recovery 
authority, with direct action to recover insurance costs 
immediately available to plaintiffs in order to speed 
remediation efforts.    
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Recovery of economic damages from GMO contamination 
should continue to be dealt with under national common or 
law or civil code provisions, taking into account relevant 
standards of care and the circumstances surrounding adjacent 
land use.  The implementation of expensive containment and 
segregation efforts will likely have to be undertaken and 
funded in large part by biotech companies, in order to 
ensure the integrity of the food supply that is demanded by 
discriminating global consumers.
Refined GMO food products have not yet presented a 
danger to public health.  Although mandatory labeling will 
impose costs on both producers and consumers, until consumer 
suspicion of GM foods wanes through periods of extended safe 
use, labeling will likely be a political, if not a safety, 
necessity.  Current products liability standards for harms 
to human health will accommodate biotech concerns, as 
regulatory oversight and product stewardship continue to 
prove effective at ensuring public safety.
Genetically modified organisms offer tremendous promise 
for achieving global sustainable development goals.  Current 
international efforts at regulatory harmonization and 
capacity building are accelerating the development of 
effective, balanced GMO liability principles.  By taking a 
holistic approach to biotechnology regulation, including the 
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development of GMO liability standards, the world can better 
manage the risks of the technology while seeing to it that 
the benefits are equitably distributed.  
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paragraph 6 of the Preamble of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (as 
amended in 1990); (2) Preamble of the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (1992); (3) Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992); (4) Article 3(3) of the U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (1992); (5) Article 3(2) of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea (1992); and (6) paragraph 4 of the Preamble, and Articles 10(6) and 11(8) of 
the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety (2000).  Id. at 444, footnote 122.  The precautionary principle, as well 
as the polluter-pays principle, has even found its way into Article 174(2) of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (EC Treaty).  European Union, Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (2002), 2002/C 325/01, at C 325/107-8, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/dat/2002/c_325/c_32520021224en00010184.pdf (Feb. 25, 2003) 
(incorporating the Treaty of Nice signed on 26 February 2001).
213 Id. at 443.
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in contravention of WTO trading rules in certain instances.   WTO Dispute Panel, European Communities –
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Aug. 18, 1997, WT/DS26/R/USA.  The U.S. 
Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) is currently being pressed to institute a similar suit to the “Beef 
Hormones” case against the E.U. for their policies in regards to GMOs.  While many believe the U.S. 
would likely win such a case, the E.U. continued to maintain their ban on hormone treated beef after the 
WTO’s 1997 ruling that such a ban was prohibited.  The E.U. has urged the U.S.T.R. not to bring formal 
WTO complaints while the E.U. is still in the process of promulgating their directive regarding civil 
liability for GMO environmental damage.  Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Delays Suing Europe Over Ban on 
Modified Food,  NY Times, Feb. 5, 2003, available at 
http://www.checkbiotech.org/root/index.cfm?fuseaction=news&doc_id=4640&start=1&control=200&page
_start=1&page_nr=101&pg=1 (Feb. 17, 2003).
For current E.U. legislative proposals regarding environmental liability for damages from GMOs, 
see Commission of the EC, White Paper on Environmental Liability 26- 27, COM(2000)66 final (9 Feb. 
2000) (proposal outlining the European Commission’s recommendations for the establishment of an E.U. 
environmental liability framework); and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental 
Damage, COM(2002) 17 final — 2002/0021 (COD); and Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Environmental Liability 
with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage (COM(2002) 17 final —
2002/0021 (COD)) Official Journal C 241 , 07/10/2002 P. 0162 – 0167, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_241/c_24120021007en01620167.pdf (Jan. 23, 2003) (the 
ECSC review of the Council and Parliament’s proposed liability directive, with suggestions for 
improvements).
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For a broader discussion of the precautionary principle and its effects on trade, see Vern R. 
Walker, Consistent Levels of Protection in International Trade Disputes: Using Risk Perception Research 
to Justify Different Levels of Acceptable Risk, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 11317 (2001) (cutting through the 
quagmire of the precautionary principle and how it can be altered to embrace a more scientific mode of risk 
assessment without altering the accepted level of risk); Marc Victor, Note, Precaution or Protectionism? 
The Precautionary Principle, Genetically Modified Organisms, and Allowing Unfounded Fear to 
Undermine Free Trade, 14 Transnat'l Law. 295 (Spring 2001) (how the E.U. is using the precautionary 
principle to protect and appease vociferous special interest farmers); Deborah Katz, The Mismatch Between 
the Biosafety Protocol and the Precautionary Principle, 13 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 949 (2001) (providing 
other interpretations of the precautionary principle which may prove more harmonious, such as that in the 
OSPAR Convention); Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle 
and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 Tex. Int'l L.J. 173 (2000) (detailing why habitat loss 
is inevitable and should not provide a basis for the precautionary principle).
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 In February 2000, the European Commission attempted to clarify its understanding of the precautionary 
principle by setting forth applicable criteria to be utilized in its application.  The communication states that 
the principle should not be applied on a discriminatory basis or so as to constitute a disguised restriction on 
trade.  Measures should be proportionate to the chosen level of protection and should be mindful of the 
costs of action or inaction.  New scientific data should subject measures to review to insure that accurate 
risk assessment.  Measures may also assign responsibilities and burdens of proof requiring parties to 
produce the necessary evidence for a comprehensive risk assessment.  York, supra note 38, at 444, citing 
the Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, Commission of the European 
Communities, COM (2000), February 2, 2000, at 7. 
 There are many commentators who believe that the precautionary principle can be applied in 
“scientifically” to a given level of risk so as not to constitute a disguised and arbitrary trade barrier.  See 
Katz, supra note 214; Walker, supra note 214; David G.Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 
of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 865 (2000) 
(assessing the effectiveness of the SPS agreement and possible clarifications to avoid disputes such as the 
application of the “precautionary principle”); and Stephen Charest, Bayesian Approaches to the 
Precautionary Principle, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 265 (Spring 2002) (exploring how Bayes’ 
Theorem’s ability to combine a prior belief about a risk with new scientific information to guide rational 
decision making in cases of true uncertainty makes it more appropriate for risk assessment under the 
precautionary principle than classical hypothesis testing scientific approaches to risk assessment.  Charest 
describes how the transparency and falsifiability of a Bayesian approach make it more appealing for risk 
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216 Id. at 443.  The characterization of foods produced through genetic engineering as “novel foods” finds 
its regulatory expression in Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43), (27 January 1997) at 2-3 
(concerning community wide safety assessments of novel food and novel food ingredients) as modified by 
Commission Regulation 49/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 6), (10 January 2000) at 2-3 (amending Council Regulation 
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The GMO regulation in the E.U. is authorized under Articles 94 and 95 of the EC Treaty.  European Union, 
supra note 212, at C 325/69-70. 
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 Endres, supra note 30, at 463-67.  The specific legislative process utilized in the E.U. varies with the 
provision of the relevant community treaty providing the authority for the legislation.  Regulations and 
directives may require differing approval procedures in the relevant E.U. bodies (Council, Commission, 
Parliament) before final implementation.  See European Union, supra note 212.
Law in the European union may be established in the courts of the E.U. as well as in its political 
organs.  According to the official E.U. legal website, EUR-Lex, “Community law may take the following 
forms: 
• Regulations which are directly applicable and binding in all EU Member States without the need 
for any national implementing legislation. 
• Directives which bind Member States as to the objectives to be achieved within a certain time-
limit while leaving the national authorities the choice of form and means to be used. Directives 
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Member States. 
• Decisions which are binding in all their aspects for those to whom they are addressed. Thus, 
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See EUR-Lex, E.U. Law - Definitions: Secondary Legislation, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/about/pap/process_and_players2.html (Feb. 25, 2003).
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 Article 5 of the EC Treaty.  European Union, supra note 212, at C 325/41-2.
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 Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 117), (23 April 1990) (setting forth procedures applicable 
prior to the release of GMOs in the E.U. environment).  For a thorough discussion of the rules and 
procedures governing release of GMOs for both research and marketing in theE.U., see Rod Hunter, & 
Koen Muylle, European Community: Product Related Regulation and Liability, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10515, at 
10531-43 (Sept. 1999) (discussing how traditional products liability law in the E.C. may apply to GMOs).
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 Endres, supra note 30, at 467.
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 Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106), (12 March 2001) (repealing Directive 90/220/EEC 
and regulating procedures applicable to the deliberate release of GMOs into the E.U., including labeling 
requirements).  Article 2(2) of Directive 2001/18 defines GMOs to be “an organism, with the exception of 
human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by 
mating and/or natural recombination.”  The deadline for Member States to implement legislation to enforce 
the directive was October 17, 2002.  That time has come and gone, with little discernible movement in the 
policies of the Member States, and the current GM ban approval moratorium continues.
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 Endres, supra note 30, at 467.
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 Teel, supra note 59, at 671, citing Council Regulation 258/97, arts. 1.2, 8.1, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1, 2-3.  
Labeling of animal feed and seed is dealt with under Article 21 of Directive 2001/18.  Current efforts are 
under discussion to harmonize labeling requirements of various GM products.  See proposals in note 231, 
below.  Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 031), (28 January 2002) establishes the European Food 
Safety Authority (ESFA).  The ESFA is charged with carrying out independent scientific risk assessments 
of food and feed products.
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relation to animal health, animal welfare and plant health.  This is essential so as to avoid repeating the 
failures of the past to identify emerging risks in one field that may have an impact on another as was the 
case with BSE which emerged initially only as an animal health problem.  The Authority will also give 
scientific advice on non-food/feed GMOs and on nutrition in relation to Community legislation.  It will 
therefore cover all stages of production and supply, from primary production, animal feed, right through to 
the supply of food to consumers.”  EFSA, Scope of European Food Safety Authority, at 
http://www.efsa.eu.int/scope_en.html (Feb. 25, 2003).  See also Article 23 of Council Regulation 178/2002, 
supra note 224, at L 31/13.
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 Endres, supra note 30, at 468.
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 However, if subsequent to a GMO’s approved release a Member State wishes to provisionally restrict 
the GMO because of justifiable reasons to consider it a risk to health or the environment, they may notify 
the Commission, and the pre-Member State consent procedures for release are repeated.  Id. at 469.  See 
also Article 22 of Directive 2001/18.
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wide safety assessments of novel food and novel food ingredients and specific labeling requirements for 
novel foods).  Council Regulation 1139/98, 1998 O.J. (L 159), (26 May 1998) as amended by Commission 
Regulation 49/2000/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 6), (10 January 2000) (requiring that products containing more than a 
1% adventitious presence of GM maize or soya must be labeled).  Other measures requiring labeling of GM 
products include Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 219; Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Concerning Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms 
and Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced From Genetically Modified Organisms and 
Amending Directive 2001/18/EC, (COM (2001) 182 final – 2001/0180(COD)), (25 July 2001); Amended 
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed, (COM (2002) 559 final – 2001/0173(COD)), (8 October 2002); Commission 
Regulation 50/2000/EC, (10 January 2000) (concerning additives or flavorings that have been genetically 
modified or produced from GMOs); and Council Directive 98/95/EEC (on the labeling of GM seed 
varieties).  The E.U. is also preparing legislation on transboundary movement and notification procedures 
in the Community.  See Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Transboundary Movement of Genetically Modified Organisms, (COM(2002) 578 final -- 2002/0046 
(COD)), (16 October 2002).  Liability for damage to the environment caused by GMOs is also the subject 
of current legislative efforts.  See Commission of the EC, supra note 214, and subsequent proposals.
232 Id., at Articles 13 and 21 of Directive 2001/18.
233 Id., at Regulation 49/2000/EC.  The special approach to maize and soya reflects the fact that at the time 
Regulation 258/97 was promulgated, GM maize and soya varieties had been approved for Community 
release and were recognized as safe, providing no basis for added labeling requirements under the safety 
assessment provisions of 258/97.
234
 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), (April 15, 
1994), Article 27(1-3), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO 
Agreement), Annex 1C, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (Jan.23, 2003) 
(outlining requirements for the protection of intellectual property rights, including plant breeders rights).  
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found in the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, (Oct. 5, 1973), 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.  
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inconsistent opinions on the ability to patent genetically engineered plants and animals.  See Darrel G. 
Dotson, Comment, The European Controversy Over Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 Hous. J. Int’l L. 919 
(1997).”  The European Patent Office issues patents enforceable throughout the E.U.  
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 Absent Community legislation, liability for GMO harms are dealt with by the legal systems in place in 
the various Member States.  Endres, supra note 30, at 470-479 provides an overview of how the U.K., 
Austria, and Germany used their statutory, common law and civil law remedies to address liability and 
damage issues related to GMO harms under Directive 90/220.  Directive 2001/18, the 2001 replacement of  
90/220, continued 90/220’s tradition of failing to include measures aimed at standardizing Community 
liability standards regarding GMOs.  Private contractual provisions may also provide ways to allocate 
liability under individual Member State law, provided such provisions do not run counter to public policy 
or are unenforceable in light of violations of statutory or civil code provisions.
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 Council Directive 85/374/EC, 1985 O.J. (L 210),  (30 July 1985); Council Directive 1999/34/EC, 1999 
O.J. (L 141), (6 April 1999).
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Products (Directive), at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l32012.htm (Feb. 25, 2003).  This includes 
producers of primary agricultural products containing GMOs, such as meat, cereals, fruits and vegetables.  
See Article 5 of Directive 85/374/EC
238 Id.  Article 3 of Directive 85/374/EC
239 Id.  Article 7 of Directive 85/374/EC
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 This is demonstrated in the U.S. by the lack of any requirements for independent product research or 
labeling.  Although those wishing to place a GM variety on the market must now notify U.S. authorities 60 
days in advance, the Coordinated Framework’s previous lack of even a notification procedure goes to show 
that the U.S. has always allowed the biotech industry to proceed with a great deal of self-regulation.
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 Activities of the E.U., supra note 237, at 3 (8).  See also Article 9(b) of Directive 89/374/EEC.
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243 See supra note 235 for Endres’ relevant discussion.
244 See Commission, and subsequent proposals, supra note 214, paragraph 2.
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 Becker, supra note 214.
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 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Environmental Liability with 
Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, Preamble (3), COM(2002) 17 final —
2002/0021 (COD).
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the environment in accordance with Directive 2001/18 are covered in Annex 1.  Art. 3(1) subjects GMOs to 
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248 Id. Article 18(1).
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252 Id. Article 3(6).
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254 Id.  Articles 4, 5, 7.
255 Id.  Article 11.
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257 Id.  Article 12.
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species listed in Annex I to Directive 79/409/EEC, or in Annexes I, II and IV to Directive 92/43/EEC, or 
habitats and species, not covered by those Directives, for which areas of protection or conservation have 
been designated pursuant to the relevant national legislation on nature conservation.”
259 Id.  Article 16.
260 Id.  Article 19.
261 Id.  Article 3(8).  Private economic rights are of course not extinguished, and Article 11(3) allows 
national legal measures to provide for private economic compensation.
262 Id.  Article 9(1)(c).
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FOEE, January 24, 2002, at http://www.foeeurope.org/press/24.01.02_The_European.htm.
264
 Proposal for a Directive, supra note 243, Annex II.
265 Id.  Article 2(1)(1).
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 Much literature exists on natural resource damage valuation.  See C. Bishop and Robert E. Unsworth, 
Assessing Natural Resource Damages Using Environmental Amenities, 11 Ecological Econ. 35 (1994).
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 “Stewardship is the legal and ethical obligation to assess product risks and ensure that products are safe 
for the environment and for human consumption.”  Remarks of Thomas Carrato, Esq., Division Counsel, 
Monsanto Company, St. Louis, Missouri during a roundtable discussion of agricultural biotechnology at the 
Missouri Botanical Garden in St. Louis, Missouri on May 26, 1999.  See Bernalyn D. McGaughey and 
Thomas P. Redick, Esq., Liability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms, Council for 
Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST), February 6, 2000, at http://www.cast-
science.org/0002abab.htm.  
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 Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 
293 (Spring 2002).  Richardson sees claim ceilings and high deductibles as insurance tools to promote safe, 
ecologically careful industry practices by insureds.  He also states that insuring against major, long term 
environmental risks could be overcome through the development of secondary markets for risk trading, 
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explores the benefits of mandating environmental liability insurance, but cautions that such a practice must 
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 For “a comparative study of national regulations concerning biotechnology, including GMOs, exploring 
the possibility and desirability of harmonizing such regulations,” see Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, "The Role of Law in 
Realising the Potential and Avoiding the Risks of Modern Biotechnology: Selected Issues of Relevance to 
Food and Agriculture" (Lyle Glowka, October 2002), available at ftp://ext-
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 York, supra note 37, at 454-465.
271 Id at 454, footnote 188. “There are currently over 30 ongoing multilateral discussions on biotechnology, 
including: Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Biotechnology; Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and Contaminants; Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods; Codex 
Committee on General Principles; Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues; Codex Committee on Food 
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trade); Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Annex 2 of 
WTO Agreement, (April 15, 1994), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf (creating the 
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), (April 15, 1994), Article 27(1-3), WTO Agreement, 
Annex 1C, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (Jan.23, 2003) (outlining 
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Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Annex 2 of WTO 
Agreement, (April 15, 1994), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf (creating the 
dispute settlement body (DSB) for the settlement of WTO member disputes). 
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 These agreements do not themselves set relevant international standards in technical or scientific 
matters.  Instead, they provide guidelines for deciding whether a state’s actions constitute an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable barrier to trade, in contravention of GATT rules.  In interpreting the language of these 
instruments the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will be informed by relevant international treaties, as well 
as state practice, to determine whether the justifications proffered by a Member nation are acceptable under 
the terms of the side agreements.  Bodies that the DSB may look to in the GM plant and plant product 
context are the Codex Alimentarius Commission (food and health standards), the International Plant 
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 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (Oct. 30, 1947), Article XX (b), (d), (g), 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm (setting forth permissible barriers 
to free trade).  Article XX contains the general exceptions, with (b), (d) and (g) being most relevant to the 
environmental context. 
Article XX: General Exceptions
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
…
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
…
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies 
operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and 
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
…
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
…
There are many WTO decisions that have helped to clarify the scope of these rules.  The most prominent 
cases interpreting Article XX, SPS and TBT provisions are the Shrimp-Turtle Case (WTO Appellate Body, 
United State--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (1998)) and the 
Beef Hormone Case (WTO Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), Jan. 16, 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, para. 41).  A prominent “labeling” case under 
GATT prior to formation of the WTO is the Tuna-Dolphin Case (United States Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993).
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 It is generally due to the WTO’s effectiveness in defeating the (arguably protectionist) policies of 
individual nations that have earned it the ill-will of protesters who see its pro-trade bias as undermining 
legitimate national environmental or health safety concerns.  Although WTO sanctions can be an effective 
threat to encourage Member nation policy compliance, they are not foolproof.   The E.U.  has maintained 
their ban on hormone treated beef despite the 1997 WTO ruling that the embargo was illegal and 
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Trade Reporter Europe, Agriculture: E.U. Plans Initiative at W.T.O. Seeking Removal of U.S. Sanctions in 
Beef Hormone Dispute, 19 ITR 2169, December 19, 2002.
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 George Monbiot, Out of the Wreckage, The Guardian, February 25, 2003, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,902274,00.html.  Monbiot describes the collapse of the 
effort to start a new round of WTO trade talks in Seattle in 1999, the relaunching of that effort in Quatar in 
2001, and the political and environmental quagmire that currently exists among developing nations that 
want lower developed world agricultural subsidies and cheaper access to needed drugs, and developed 
countries like the U.S. and E.U. who are intent on not conceding as much.  The global protests that 
dismantled the WTO talks in Seattle in ’99 are anticipated to be equally strong at the ministerial meeting in 
Mexico in September 2003.  Another repeat of Seattle could signify the end of the WTO.  The increasing 
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